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Parity, Incomparability and Rationally Justified Choice (2009)
Philosophical Studies 146: 75-92
This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either ('3NT'). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them.
Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity - a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations 'better than', 'worse than' and 'equally good as'. It follows, she argues, that many choice situations in which rationally justified choice seems precluded are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason.
This article has three aims: (1) it challenges Chang's argument for the possibility of parity; (2) it demonstrates that, even if parity would exist, its problematic implications for practical reason would not differ from those of Raz's incomparability; (3) it discusses the underlying cause of hard cases of comparison: the fact that none of the three standard value relations applies ('3NT'). It will be shown that the problematic implications for the rational justification of the choice are due to 3NT itself, irrespective of whether 3NT is explained as incomparability or parity.
Keywords: Parity, Incomparability, Rationally justified choice
Conflicts of Justice
Draft
This paper starts from the premise that justice is a multidimensional concept, the aspects of which are related to values such as equality, liberty, merit and concern for the worst-off. The thesis to be defended is that these values may conflict and that, as a corollary, demands of justice may conflict as well. In A Theory of Justice John Rawls emphasizes the importance of a conception of justice that enables a ‘proper balance’ and a complete ranking of conflicting claims. However, the values and aspects of justice on which the relevant demands are based are incommensurable, which renders the assessment of a ‘proper balance’ problematic. Under certain conditions incommensurability leads to ‘incomplete comparability’. This entails three kinds of ‘incompleteness’:
1) The relevant demands of justice cannot be completely ordered.
2) Either decision between two incompletely comparable demands entails a loss in moral or other value not outweighed by the gain.
3) The relevant decision cannot be (completely) rationally or morally justified.
Incomplete ranking of options is the consequence of either inconclusiveness, waiting for rational resolution, or ‘indeterminability’, lacking rational resolvability in principle. The argument developed in this paper suggests that the incomplete ordering of the relevant competing demands concerns indeterminability rather than inconclusiveness. If so, this means that there may be conflicts of justice for which there is no rational or moral solution. In those cases the justification of the final decision is ‘partial’ in the double sense of ‘incomplete’ and ‘biased’.
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Non-equality versus Rough equality
Work in progress
The purpose of this paper is to show that the notion ‘rough/imprecise equality’ contains and conceals two distinct phenomena: i) ‘real imprecise equality’; ii) ‘non-equality’. ‘Real imprecise equality’ is an imprecise version of ‘precise equality’: the relevant items are, although not precisely, still approximately equally good. ‘Non-equal’ items, by contrast, are even not approximately equally good. This makes the name ‘rough/ imprecise equality’ for the latter phenomenon inadequate and confusing. More importantly, neglecting the relevant distinction suggests that ‘rough equality’ poses no problems for rational decision making. This is true for ‘real imprecise equality’ but not for ‘non-equality’, which has significant implications for practical reason.
The Problem of Incommensurability
Work in progress
This article discusses the implications of value-incommensurability for practical reason. Two values (or options bearing these values) are incommensurable if their amounts have unlike and irreducible dimensions so that they cannot be measured by the same scale. The following conclusions will be drawn:
• A central characteristic of incommensurability is the absence of an (even roughly) determinate equivalence-relation between the relevant values, due to their unlike and irreducible dimensions. That is why an (even roughly) determinate (or ‘single right’) balance or trade-off between these values does not exist.
• Incommensurability is not identical to incomparability. Countless incommensurable options are perfectly comparable. Still incommensurability is an important and necessary – although not sufficient – condition of incomplete comparability. Incomplete comparability means that neither of two options is determinately better than the other, while they are not (roughly) equally good either.
• The main problem of incommensurability – if it leads to incomplete comparability – concerns three kinds of ‘incompleteness’: (1) Incomplete ordering of options with respect to their relative value and choice-worthiness. (2) Loss of ‘complete value’: any choice or compromise between the relevant options involves a loss of irreducible value, not outweighed by the gain in other values. (3) Incomplete justification of the final choice (which is problematic if the options represent important rival interests or conflicting moral requirements).
• Incommensurability does not prevent coherent rational deliberation. However, because an (even roughly) determinate balance or trade-off between the relevant values does not exist, rational deliberation does not resolve the main problem of incommensurability mentioned in the previous point.
Rationality of Nurtured Beliefs
Draft
Many beliefs are induced by upbringing and education. G.A. Cohen raises the question why we persist in a belief if we know that we have this belief, rather than a rival one, because we were brought up to believe it. Cohen adduces an ‘Argument’ that seems to demonstrate the irrationality of such a belief. The present paper analyses the Argument and concludes that it is fallacious. First, it confuses (efficient) causes with (sustaining) reasons. The original causes of a belief are irrelevant to the question whether it is rationally justified to persist in it. Second, it erroneously assumes that persistence in a nurtured belief requires superior credentials in order to be rational.
Acknowledgment
I thank G.A. Cohen for his comment on an earlier version of this paper.
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The Good, the Just and the Right in the distribution of scarce health care resources
Draft
Maximization of aggregate health benefit from health care resources may conflict with fair distribution. The aim is to investigate whether this tension between ‘the good’ and ‘the just’ has a ‘right’ resolution. The paper concentrates on the (im)possibility to resolve the conflict by assignment of relative weights to equity and efficiency.
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